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may be reached regarding the problems discussed until a final interpreta-
tion is given the first proviso to section 9(a). When the occasion arises,
it seems probable that the Board will attempt to construe the proviso as
only vesting a permissive right in the employer. Under the Board's in-
terpretation of the proviso as originally enacted in the Wagner Act, the
union had the right to be present and negotiate at every stage of the
grievance procedure.6 Also, as mentioned before, the Board attempted
to limit the protection of the proviso to grievances which were not
covered by the collective contract.62 These early sentiments have found
contemporaneous expression in opinions of the General Counsel" and
Davey Corp. 4 Doubtless the Board's position is premised on its judg-
ment that the goal of industrial peace can best be reached by limiting the
individual employee's voice in grievance matters to expression through
the statutory representative. The courts, however, may tend to be less
influenced by such matters of policy than by more legalistic polemics
relevant to an interpretation of the proviso.
PROSECUTOR INDISCRETION: A RESULT OF POLITICAL
INFLUENCE
Pollock and Maitland indicate that it was the thirteenth century be-
fore barbaric justice in England was brought under control, and public
inquiries of witnesses replaced trial by combat.' But when juries ceased
to be bodies of official witnesses of facts within their knowledge and be-
came judges of the evidence, criminal trials ceased to be wholly public
inquiries and took on characteristics of private litigation.2 It became
necessary to collect and present evidence instead of relying on the knowl-
edge of the jury. Since parliament did not provide for a public officer
to represent the king and to collect and present this evidence, private
61. Matter of Hughes Tool Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944), inodified, 147 F.2d 69
(5th Cir. 1945). For a general review of the Board's interpretation of the proviso under
the Wagner Act, see Rose, The Processing of Labor Grievances, 38 VA. L. REV. 285,
295-310 (1952).
62. NLRB v. North American Aviation, Inc., 136 F.2d 898, 899 (9th Cir. 1943).
63. Case No. 418, 31 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1952); Case No. 317, 30 L.R.R.M. 1103
(1952). These rulings hold only that the employer can refuse to hear individual grievances
which were attempted to be presented under § 9(a). See also General Cable Corp.,
20 Lab. Arb. 443 (1953).
64. See text accompanying notes 4246 supra.
1. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 579, 598-601 (2d ed.
1898).
2. 1 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 496-98 (1883).
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persons had to assume many of these functions. 3
The first public prosecutors to appear in English law seem to have
come from rather obscure origins. Stephen believes they first arose as
general agents or representatives of the king and of other powerful
noblemen who had a special interest in keeping the peace.4 These general
agents were the forerunners of the modem attorney-general, and, prior
to 1879, they were the only officers resembling public prosecutors in
England.5 Private persons or the police secured indictments from the
grand jury and provided a solicitor and a barrister to prosecute in the
name of the king.6 Stephen says the present peculiar likeness of criminal
trials to private litigation is largely caused by the fact that "private
vengeance of the person wronged by a crime was the principal source to
which men trusted for the administration of criminal justice."7  A vic-
tim or his friends might prosecute and bear the expense personally or be
the complaintants in a police prosecution at the expense of the state.'
The reform which came to the English substantive criminal law fell
short of reforming the criminal law administration and procedure.' As
early as 1790 Jeremy Bentham advocated that a system of public prose-
cution be adopted to support and control the private system." The de-
fects of private prosecution were many. The expense involved in secur-
ing legal prosecution deterred many complaintants." Bribery, corrup-
tion, and illegal compromise of the interests of society were also standard
complaints. 2 It was further complained that the theory of criminal law
enforcement was based on vengeance, while the objective of the criminal
law was the prevention of crime. 3 There was no uniformity of prosecu-
tion. It is also probable that the threat of a suit for malicious prosecu-
tion facing the unsuccessful instigator of a criminal action often resulted
3. HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 382-83 (1931); 1 STEPHEN, Op. Ct.
supra note 2, at 496-98.
4. 1 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 499-501.
5. Ibid.
6. HOWARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 11-15.
7. 1 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 245.
8. HOWARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 15-19. The majority of prosecutions in England
today are instituted and conducted by the police upon the complaint of a private
individual. Id. at 15.
9. Id. at 46-48.
10. 4 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 300-01, 384-406 (1843).
11. 1 CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 817-29 (2d ed. 1826);
1 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 498-99; HOWARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 8-10. It
was necessary to offer private prosecutors many inducements and rewards, as evidenced
in the materials cited.
12. Eighth Report of the Criminal Law Commission, XIV Parliamentary Papers
Number 656 (1845).
13. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *364; 1 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 245;
1 CHITTY op. cit. supra note 11, at 2-3.
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in overzealous eagerness to convict."4 A closely related complaint was
that the police, feeling it their duty to enforce laws relentlessly, sought
convictions too fiercely.' 5 These factors often resulted in unfair treat-
ment of the accused.
The ancient connection between private vengeance and prosecution
was one of the major defects of private prosecution which eventually led
to the establishment of the Director of Public Prosecutions in England in
1879.6 The establishment of this office was not meant to change the
existing system materially and the government was not committed "to
the policy of undertaking any except the most important criminal pro-
ceedings."'" The Director's powers were in theory simply those of a
private person and have not been supplemented materially by modern
legislation. Thus, the Director prosecutes for murders and various other
crimes which are complex or which may have major political significance.
His importance lies in the complexity of cases he does prosecute and "in
the powerful restraining influence which he exercises over the activities
of both private prosecutors and the police.""
In early colonial America, the general assemblies and the legisla-
tures constituted the sole courts of law in a colony. Later the governor
or his deputies took over these functions. It was not until about 1675
that courts appeared, and it was yet another hundred years before the
laymen on these courts were replaced with judges learned in the law."
In each colony there was an office which closely resembled the office of
the attorney-general in England. 2' The first public prosecutors in colonial
America appeared in Connecticut in 1704 as local assistants to the
attorney-general of the colony.2 ' Other colonies and territories, and
subsequently states, followed this precedent, so that it can be said ac-
curately that the office of prosecuting attorney grew out of the office of
14. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 1, at 539-40; POUND, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 92-94 (2d ed. 1945).
15. HowARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 58-62.
16. 42 & 43 Vicr. c. 22 (1879); HowARD, op. cit. SUpra note 3, at 5-6; POUND,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 54-57. "In the year 1879, the ancient connection between private
vengeance and public prosecution was finally severed, or, at least reduced to the slenderest
proportions by the establishment of a Public Prosecutor.... ." JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 351 (5th ed. 1938).
17. HoWARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 39.
18. Id. at 41.
19. VARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 3-18 (1911). Throughout the
17th century and well into the 18th century, attorneys were held in very low esteem
and practically excluded from colonial society. POUND, op. cit. supra note 14, at 117-21.
20. MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 57-58 (1929).
21. H.G. JAMES, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 144 (1921).
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the atto'rney-general 2
It seems rather striking to realize that America had public prosecu-
tors before England. Some writers believe that the Dutch influence gave
rise to a public prosecutor in America at such an early date.2" Others
feel that the office arose to aid the office of the attorney-general because
the latter could not perform his duties over a large area.24 Probably an
additional reason can be found in the brutality, vengeance, and lack of
respect for individual rights which is evidenced in early English criminal
justice.
It is readily apparent that one of the major factors lending impetus
to the change to public prosecution was the desire to vest the prosecuting
functions in an impartial public official. In the United States, the prose-
cuting attorney as a public official has assumed obligations comparable
to those of a trustee. The prosecuting attorney is a public officer elected
or appointed and, depending on his origin, is classified as a constitutional
officer or statutory officer.2" The prosecutor's powers and duties may
be set forth in the constitution, in statutes, or in both.2" Where his duties
are prescribed by the constitution, it has been held that they may not be
changed by statute.2 Usually, however, duties are statutory and may be
increased or decreased by the legislature.2"
The prosecuting attorney represents all of the people of his jurisdic-
tion, including the accused." He is a public officer, i.e., a public servant,
and as such he owes a duty to act primarily for the benefit of the public.2"
22. GooDNow, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINIsTRATnm LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 411-14
(1905).
23. Comment, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 125.
24. See authorities cited notes 21-22 supra.
25. In all but six states and the federal government, prosecuting attorneys are
elected. In Connecticut they are appointed by the court in which they prosecute. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 51-148 (1958). In New Jersey the Governor appoints the county prosecu-
tors, with the advice and consent of the state senate. N.J. CONST. art. VII § 2 (1947).
In California and North Carolina some local prosecutors are appointed. CAL. CONsT.
art. XI § 5; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-235, 7-408 (1953). In Delaware and Rhode Island
the attorney-general carries on local prosecutions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 2502
(Supp. 1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 42, § 9-8 (1956). One United States Attorney
is appointed for each judicial district by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 28 U.S.C. § 501 (1952 ed.).
26. For a more extensive treatment of this topic, see Baker and DeLong, The
Prosecuting Attorney: Provisions of Law Organizing the Office, 23 J. Clum. L., C. &
P.S. 926 (1933).
27. State ex rel. Hamilton v. Troy, 190 Wash. St. 483, 68 P.2d 413 (1937).
28. 'State ex rel. Hench v. Morrison, 64 Ind. 141 (1878); In re Gilson, 34 Kan.
641, 9 Pac./763 (1886).
29: Veople v. Crabb, 372 Ill. 347, 24 N.E.2d 46 (1939) ; oState v. Peters, 82 R.I.
292, 107 A.2d 428 (1954).
30. State v. Kearns, 129 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio C.P. Franklin County Ct. 1955).
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He is sworn to uphold both the state and federal constitutions."' Most
prosecutors, as well as the United States District Attorneys, are quasi-
judicial officers of the court.32 They have the same duty as the trial
court to see that justice is administered in conformity with recognized
principles of law.3" The prosecutor's chief function is to prosecute viola-
tions of the criminal laws. 4 In so prosecuting, however, his ultimate
goal is to aid in the ascertainment of truth and justicq. It is as much a
duty of the prosecutor to see that the accused is not deprived of any of
his rights as it is for him to prosecute the accused for the crime with
which he may be charged. This means that the prosecutor must con-
duct the state's case and present the state's evidence in an impartial
manner.
It has been argued that the prosecutor is "necessarily a partisan."3
This is in error. When the office of the prosecutor is viewed historic-
ally and the duties and trust viewed objectively, it must be conceded that
the prosecuting attorney cannot be a representative of all the people, in-
cluding the accused, and yet be a partisan, eager to convict." He cannot
be a judicial or quasi-judicial officer of the court striving to achieve truth
and justice and yet be allowed to use any methods necessary to build a
record of convictions. In short, he cannot be a persecutor and at the
131. Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney: Legal Aspects of the Office, 26 J. CRIm. L.,
C. & P.S. 647 (1936).
V. 132. *Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955) ; CDowney v. Allen, 97
P.2d 515 (Cal. App. Div. 1939); McDonald v. Goldstein, 191 Misc. 863, 83 N.Y.S.2d
620, affirming 273 App. Div. 649, 79 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup. Ct. 1948). Indiana is the only
state which refers to county prosecutors as "judicial officers"; State ex rel. aSpencer
v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 214 Ind. 551, 15 N.E.2d 1020 (1938) ;*State v.
Henning, 33 Ind. 189 (1870).
33. Wasy v. State, 236 Ind. 215, 138 N.E.2d 1 (1956).
34. Baker and DeLong, The Prosecuting Attorney, Powers and Duties in Criminal
Prosecution, 24 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 1025 (1934). The prosecutor also has many
important civil functions. The attorney-general normally is in charge of civil litigation
on behalf of the state, and the prosecutor has power and authority to represent the
state in civil proceedings only where the authority is expressly conferred by statute.
35. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); Minker v. United
States, 85 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1936) ; Beck v. United States, 33 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1929) ;
Griffin v. United States, 295 Fed. 437 (3d Cir. 1924) ; Wasy v. State, 236 Ind. 215,
138 N.E.2d 1 (1956); Caveney v. State, 210 Ind. 455, 4 N.E.2d 137 (1936); Adams v.
State, 202 Miss. 68, 30 So. 2d 593 (1947) ; State ex rel. Griffin v. Smith, 363 Mo. 1235,
258 S.W.2d 590 (1953) ; State v. Toner, 127 Mont. 283, 263 P.2d 971 (1953) ; Neill v.
State, 89 Okla. Crim. 272, 207 P.2d 344 (1949); Brower v. State, 26 Okla. Crim. 49,
221 Pac. 1050 (1924) ; People v. Reilly, 191 Misc. 888, 83 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Kings County
Ct. 1948).
36. Keyes v. State, 122 Ind. 527, 23 N.E. 1097 (1890). See also Hobbs, Prosecutor's
Bias, An Occupational Disease, 2 ALA. L. REv. 40 (1949).
37. State v. Lewis 133 W. Va. 584, 57 S.E.2d 513 (1949). Cf. United States v.
Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 602 (2d Cir. 1952), where Judge Frank speaks of the "liberal
limits of legitimate partisanship and argumentation our courts customarily allow
counsel." (Emphasis added.)
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
same time fulfill his functions as a prosecutor.3"
The prosecuting attorney has a vast amount of power, and hence a
like amount of responsibility. He is charged with the responsibility of
determining whether or not a criminal prosecution should be pressed to
trial and thus is expected to be impartial in abstaining from prosecuting
as well as in prosecuting. 9 Subject to some limitations, he has the power
to discontinue a prosecution.4" He is presumed to have much influence
with jurors, both grand and petit, and it is presumed that they place much
credance in his statements.4
It is readily conceded that a prosecutor should present the state's
strongest case. The words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in the universally
applauded opinion of Berger v. United States, accentuate the difference
between presenting a strong case with zeal and presenting a case with
improper methods: "He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-in-
deed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones."42
From the brief listing of the obligations of the prosecutor and the
trust which he holds, it would be imagined that he would be an experi-
enced and qualified attorney, noted and selected for his integrity and
ability. Indeed, one should visualize him in a modern, well equipped and
well staffed office, free from any possibility of political control. He
should have a long term of office; he should have a territorial jurisdic-
tion based on population; and he should be responsible to a central body
resembling a state justice department. 3
But, far from the above, the prosecuting attorney is elected in all but
six states and the federal government.44 The candidate is seldom an ex-
perienced and qualified attorney. In at least one state, he need not be a
lawyer, or even learned in the law. Typically, the candidate is a young
lawyer seeking experience and recognition. While the quest for experi-
38. As the canons of professional ethics put it: "The primary duty of a lawyer
engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice is done." A.B.A.,
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, CANON 5 (1908).
39. Engle v. Chipman, 51 Mich. 524, 16 N.W. 886 (1883); Commonwealth v.
Ragone, 317 Pa. 113, 176 Atl. 454 (1935) ; Macon v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 363, 46
S.E.2d 396 (1948).
40. Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. Rsv. 1057 (1955).
41. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); Lewis v. State, 137 Ind. 344,
36 N.E. 1110 (1894). See also Note, 12 TEmP. L.Q. 496 (1938).
42. 295 U.S. 78, at 88.
43. POUND, op. cit. supra note 14, at 182-88; Caldwell, How To Make Prosecuting
Effectual, 16 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 73 (1932). But see MOLEY, op. cit. supra note 21, at 228.
44. See authorities cited note 27 supra.
45. State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, 116 Minn. 313, 133 N.AV. 857 (1911)
State ex rel. Knappen v. Clough, 23 Minn. 17 (1876); Note, 10 MINN. L. REv. 620
(1926).
NOTES
ence and recognition is desirable and not to be discouraged, the office of
the prosecuting attorney is neither the classroom for zealous interns nor
the campaign headquarters for students of political science. It is a
solemn trust of vast power which deserves a more qualified and devoted
trustee than the youthful political aspirant.
The attitude of the general public toward the prosecutor's office is
not very objective or accurate. As pointed out by Baker and DeLong,
the average voter is acquainted with the office of the prosecuting at-
torney only through the press. He believes that the office exists pri-
marily to prosecute felons; not to perform the other important criminal
and civil functions.46 The public demands that the criminal laws be en-
forced, but rarely realizes that the prosecutor is also a protector of the
rights of the accused. Dean Pound points out that when communities
and dockets were small, political responsibility was a check on the prose-
cutor." Today, the office of the prosecutor is too remote from the
public to rely upon responsibility to the voter to insure proper behavior.
A more important attitude, however, is that of the prosecutor him-
self. All too often he views his position as a stepping stone to a higher
political office. He seldom realizes the responsibility which rests on his
shoulders. He may be too concerned with winning favor with the public
and keeping his name in the headlines to safeguard properly the rights
of all the people in his jurisdiction."
Moley sees the prosecutor's office as completely political, dominated
in large city areas by syndicates and used in rural areas as a political step-
ping stone."0 He considers the control of urban prosecutors as the most
serious problem, since organized crime is able to exist simply because it
has reached the most vital spot in criminal law enforcement, i.e., the
prosecutor."'
The evils and misfortunes fostered by our system of elective short-
term prosecutors are many and varied. There is, however, one especially
undesirable effect which deserves special attention. When the prosecu-
tor is selected for his political capacities rather than his legal capacities,
he must remain in the political spotlight. To remain in this position, the
prosecutor is tempted too easily to indiscretion, imprudence, and often
46. Baker and DeLong, The Prosecuting Attorney: Powers and Duties in Criminal
Prosecution, 24 J. CRIn. L., C. & P.S. 1025 (1934).
47. POUND, op. cit. supra note 14, at 185.
48. For example, see the "letter" from a former United States Attorney in 20
THE SHINGLE 139 (1957) where he indicates that the office of United States Attorney
is a fine political "springboard." See also BOTEIN, THE PROSECUTOR (1956).
49. MOLEY, op. cit. supra note 21, at 74-94.
50. Id. at 13.
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outright misconduct."
This indiscretion or misconduct may occur at both pre-trial and trial
stages of a criminal proceeding.2 Pre-trial indiscretions may occur in
the form of administering the "third degree,"53 suppressing evidence fa-
vorable to the accused,54 and releasing inflammatory or prejudicial state-
ments to the press.55 Trial indiscretions may take the form of inflam-
matory appeals to arouse prejudice in the jury ;" subtle use of argument
to get evidence before the jury which would have been inadmissible if
properly offered ;57 improper comment on the failure of the defendant to
testify;"s misleading the jury as to their obligations by referring to the
defendant's right to appeal, possibility of pardon or parole, and possi-
bility of executive clemency ;5" attempts to establish material facts not by
proof but by personal assertionsf ° and attempts to introduce new and
material facts in the summation." These indiscretions generally are
meant to prevent the jury from deciding the guilt or innocence of the
51. The phrase "forensic misconduct" has been popularly used to include almost
all improprieties of prosecutors, whether they result from deliberate misconduct, from
an unawareness of responsibility, or from an inability or incapacity to prosecute properly.
52. The examples of indiscretions referred to in the text are not intended to be
exhaustive. For a thorough discussion of prosecutor improprieties, see Note, The Nature
and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54
CoLum. L. Rxv. 946 (1954).
53. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (five days interrogation without
formal charges, including at least one all night session) ; People v. Borello, 161 Cal.
367, 379, 119 Pac. 500, 505 (1911) ("... deception, threats, and intimidations, emphasized
with coarse profanity.").
54. People v. Reilly, 191 Misc. 888, 83 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Kings County Ct. 1948)
(expert favorable to defense was dismissed by prosecutor).
55. Griffin v. United States, 295 Fed. 437 (3d Cir. 1924) (release of refusal to
allow the defendants to turn state's evidence) ; Wasy v. State, 236 Ind. 215, 138 N.E.2d
1 (1956) ; Note, Inflamatory Pre-Trial Releases by the Prosecutor and the Due Process
Clause, 47 Nw. U.L. Rav. 728 (1952).
56. Fontanello v. United States, 19 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1927) (statement that the
majority of persons operating stills in the county are Italian) ; State v. Tiedt, 357 Mo.
115, 121, 206 S.W.2d 524, 528 (1947) ("... blood spurting from their bodies into
the gutter.").
57. Whitfield v. State, 21 Ala. App. 490, 109 So. 524 (1926) (repeated reference to
offense committed subsequent to offense in issue); Cline v. State, 52 Okla. Crim. 206,
47 P.2d 191 (1935) (improperly impeaching defendant's character).
58. May v. State, 209 Ala. 72, 73, 95 So. 279, 280 (1923) ("If he has a reason,
why didn't he give it?"); People v. Leavitt, 301 N.Y. 113, 118, 92 N.E.2d 915, 918
(1950) (". . . you and I wouldn't sit back and have the state police or anyone else
accuse us . . . if we were in fact innocent.").
59. Goff v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 428, 44 S.W.2d 306 (1931) (reference to
defendant's right to appeal) ; Deutsch v. State, 46 Ohio App. 223, 188 N.E. 399 (1932)
(statement that the appellate courts will correct any error which the jury might make).
60. Brower v. State, 26 Okla. Crim. 49, 53, 221 Pac. 1050, 1052 (1924) ("... I
have my reasons.").
61. People v. Fielding, 158 N.Y. 542, 53 N.E. 497 (1899) ; Note, The Permissible
Scope of Summation, 36 COLUm. L. Rav. 931 (1936).
NOTES
accused by weighing the legally admissible evidence. Such indiscretions
result primarily from seeking a conviction, rather than the ascertainment
of truth and justice, and stem from the political nature of the prosecu-
tor's office. As Dean Pound pointed out in 1924:
Politics requires taking advantage of possibilities of publicity.
• . . the need of getting results puts pressure upon prosecutors
to use the "third degree," to suppress evidence, to bulldoze
witnesses, and generally to indulge in that lawless enforcement
of law which produces a vicious circle of disrespect for law.62
If poor conduct and indiscretion were the only ill influences politics
had on prosecution, the problem would hardly merit national concern.
But the analysis cannot be restricted to proper or improper conduct. Mis-
conduct and indiscretion result in deprivations of individual rights and
in reduced trial court standards. Chief among these effects is the depri-
vation of the fundamental right of every person accused of a crime to
have a fair trial.63 To allow the prosecuting attorney to use admittedly
improper tactics to secure convictions and still maintain that the "sub-
stantial rights" of the accused were not prejudiced is to overlook one of
the most substantial rights: the right of the accused to have a fair and
impartial hearing.64 The state cannot, on the one hand, guarantee accused
persons a fair and impartial trial, and on the other hand, allow its evi-
dence to be offered by its own representative in other than a fair and
impartial manner.
It is also to be remembered that the fourteenth amendment of the
federal constitution provides: " . nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.. ,
It is hardly "due process of law" when a quasi-judicial officer strives
primarily for a conviction and uses any means at his disposal, proper or
improper, to achieve this purpose. Due process is satisfied only when
the prosecutor strives for truth and justice.66
The responsibility for maintaining proper trial court standards rests
primarily with the officers of the trial court.67 Yet, as criminal prose-
62. POUND, op. cit. supra note 14, at 185-86.
63. "A fair and impartial trial means that no undue advantage shall be taken by
the District Attorney or anyone else." People v. Nationwide News Service, Inc., 172
/ 1isc. 752, 775, 16 N.Y.S.2d 277, 279 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County 1939).
64. Note, Prosecutor Forensic Misconduct--"Harmless Error"?, 6 UTAH L. Rzv.
108 (1958).
65. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
66. State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958).
67. OSBORN, THE MIND OF THE JUROR 203-11 (1937) ; FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL,
222-24 (1949).
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cution becomes increasingly a struggle akin to private litigation, the trial
judge is the only court officer thinking in terms of judicial calm and try-
ing to maintain proper standards. If the trial judge fails or refuses to
require proper conduct of counsel, standards are lost unless an appellate
tribunal realizes that one of its main functions is to insure the mainte-
nance of proper standards in its trial courts.6" The majority of appellate
courts in the United States are unaware of this function. They look to
see whether or not justice has been accomplished in terms of the correct-
ness of the result and concentrate on developing the law of the jurisdic-
tion. They fail to appreciate a third function-the maintenance of trial
court standards in the jurisdiction."
Examples of this failure can be seen in the many cases where an ob-
viously guilty appellant shows on appeal that the prosecuting attorney
was guilty of indiscretion or misconduct during the trial."' The appellate
court has usually considered the result below in terms of its correctness
and in terms of its sentence and said:
[I]t seems to us that a conviction was at all events inevitable,
and as the punishment assessed does not seem to have been out
of proportion to the offense, we can not see that there would
have been any prejudice to the substantial rights of the appel-
lant. In such a case we are not authorized to reverse.7'
Thus, in cases where the result seems correct, the appellate court con-
siders indiscretion or misconduct as "harmless error." This is tanta-
mount to saying that if one is obviously guilty as charged, he has no
fundamental right to be tried fairly. Yet this is precisely the attitude of
an overwhelming majority of appellate courts. The prosecutors through-
out the jurisdiction receive a "green light" to secure convictions at the
expense of the rights of the accused. When this same appellate court
confronts a situation of substantially similar indiscretion or misconduct
68. ORFIELD, CRImINAL APPEALS IN AmERIcA 185-87 (1939).
69. Ibid.
70. In People v. Slover, 232 N.Y. 264, 133 N.E. 633 (1921), the district attorney
vas guilty of several forms of intentional misconduct, chiefly aimed at prejudicing the
jury, and the defendant appealed a first degree murder conviction, alleging that the
improper appeals to prejudice deprived him of a fair trial. The court affirmed the
conviction unanimously, reasoning that "it is inconceivable that the calmest and most
dispassionate conduct on the part of the district attorney would have changed the result
herein, and, therefore, the ends of justice require an affirmance." Id. at 270, 133 N.E. at
635. In Robbins v. United States, 229 Fed. 987 (9th Cir. 1916), the court said, "No pos-
sible misconduct on the part of the district attorney could have affected the conclusion."
Id. at 988. See also People v. Dixon, 99 Cal. App. 2d 94, 221 P.2d 198 (1950) ; State v.
Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953) ; Hall v. State, 68 Okla. Crim. 367, 99 P.2d
163 (1940).
71. Heyl v. State, 109 Ind. 589, 595, 10 N.E. 916, 919 (1887).
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in a case where the evidence is conflicting and close, it reasons correctly
that the indiscretion or misconduct might well have swayed the result;
hence trial court standards and individual rights are preserved with sting-
ing reprisals and immediate reversals."
Appellate courts throughout the United States have wrestled long
and hard with the problems of indiscretion, imprudence, and misconduct
of public prosecutors. Appellate justices time and time again have con-
demned this poor conduct and warned prosecutors to keep within the
bounds of propriety.7 3  Later opinions reflect the result-frustrating
failure.7" The appellate tribunals have found to their dismay that they
cannot uphold a conviction and yet successfully condemn the method by
which it was secured. Carefully written opinions condemning the in-
discretion and misconduct have not been successful to curb improprieties.
The very act of upholding the conviction has given prosecutors approval,
and the "judicial slap on the wrist" has not deterred the prosecutor from
his unethical and improper tactics.75
72. In People v. Freedman, 4 III. 2d 414, 123 N.E.2d 317 (1954), the court reversed
a conviction of taking immoral and indecent liberties with a female child because "the
evidence . . . was close and highly conflicting. . . . It is impossible for us to say on
this record that defendant was not prejudiced by the argument in question." Id. at 422,
123 N.E.2d at 321. See also United States v. Levi, 177 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1949);
People v. Evans, 39 Cal. 2d 242, 246 P.2d 636 (1952) ; Brow v. State, 103 Ind. 133, 2
N.E. 296 (1885). Baker believes that appellate courts hesitate to base a reversal upon
the evidence, since they do not wish to admit that they are invading the fact finding
province of the jury. They prefer a more "legal" basis and fasten upon indiscretion or
misconduct of the prosecuting attorney as the basis for reversal in a close case. Baker,
The Prosecuting Attorney: Legal Aspects of the Office, 26 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 647,
659 (1936).
73. Courts often state that they would affirm the conviction without opinion
except that it would appear to give approval to the misconduct. So they write an
opinion affirming the conviction but attacking the method by which it was secured.
See, e.g., State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953) ; People v. Watson, 216
N.Y. 565, 111 N.E. 243 (1916). See also attacks on prosecutors improprieties in the
following cases where the convictions were left undisturbed: Baker v. United States,
115 F.2d 533, 543 (8th Cir. 1940) (". unethical, highly reprehensible, and meriting
unqualified condemnation.") ; Heyl v. State, 109 Ind. 589, 595, 10 N.E. 916, 919 (1887)
(". .. can not be justified").
74. In State v. Poston, 199 Iowa 1073, 203 N.W. 257 (1925), the Supreme Court
of Iowa said: "We are unable to understand why prosecuting attorneys persist in thus
infracting the well established rules of practice. This court has repeatedly warned pros-
ecutors about these dangers, and it seems rather strange that, in spite of these warnings,
prosecutors persist in this practice." Id. at 1075, 203 N.W. at 258.
75. In the dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge Frank, in United States v. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946), an
excellent example of appellate frustration is seen: "This court has several times used
vigorous language in denouncing government counsel for such conduct as that of the
United States Attorney here. But, each time, it has said that, nevertheless, it would not
reverse. Such an attitude of helpless piety is, I think, undesirable. It means actual
condonation of counsel's alleged offense, coupled with verbal disapprobation. If we
continue to do nothing practical to prevent such conduct, we should cease to disapprove
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However, there is strong indication of a trend, especially in Indiana
and Montana, to make paramount on appeal the question: "Did the de-
fendant receive a fair trial ?" This trend first appeared in Indiana in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Richman in Blue v. State.7" Prior to this
case, Indiana had been unerringly committed to a general policy of revers-
ing only in cases where the conviction was not inevitable or where the
result appeared unduly severe.
Blue, a striking employee on picket duty, was convicted of com-
mitting an assault and battery on a non-striking employee during a 1944
strike. The principal ground for appeal was the alleged improper con-
duct of the prosecutor during cross examination and in argument. The
prosecutor referred to the defendant as a saboteur and a hoodlum and
said that he should be made to face a firing squad. He pictured the de-
fendant as worse than a German spy. He asked witnesses for the de-
fense (other striking employees) what their draft status was and whether
they were aware of the war and the need for munitions. He even ques-
tioned women strikers who witnessed the offense as to the draft status of
their husbands." On appeal, the defendant argued that he was deprived
of a fair trial by the misconduct of the prosecutor.
The majority of the Supreme Court of Indiana noted that the de-
fense failed to object to most of these statements and that there was no
motion to set aside the submission. However, the court considered the
misconduct as though the defense had objected and had not waived
further complaint. It toned down the statements of the prosecutor, and
said that he merely referred to the fact that there was a war and that war
production was being retarded by the strike. It said that the prosecutor
it. . . . Government counsel, employing such tactics, are the kind who, eager to win
victories, will gladly pay the small price of a ritualistic verbal spanking. The practice
of this court-recalling the bitter tear shed by the Walrus as he ate the oysters-breeds a
deplorably cynical attitude towards the judiciary." 155 F.2d at 661.
76. 224 Ind. 394, 67 N.E.2d 377 (1946).
77. For examples of cases reflecting the prior policy, see Heyl v. State, 109 Ind.
589, 10 N.E. 916 (1887) ; Epps v. State, 102 Ind. 539, 1 N.E. 491 (1885).
78. As illustrating the prosecuting attorney's concept of an "argument to the jury,"
the following excerpt is presented: "This hoodlum by the acts which have been proved
in evidence is no better than a saboteur, and should be made to face a firing squad.
[Note that this was a prosection for a misdemeanor.] This defendant, Pete Blue, his
instructed witnesses, and the hoodlum from this picket line are worse than saboteurs.
. . . Over in Germany such men as this defendant here would be shot by a firing
squad. . . . These fellows are worse than German spies sent over here from Nazi-land.
This fellow, Blue, must have animal blood in him to do what he has done. . . . If you
jurors think any thing of your soldier and sailor sons and daughters give this fellow
the limit of the law, and if you don't think of your sons and daughters, for God's sake
think of my son who is over there." Blue v. State, 224 Ind. 394, 414-15, 67 N.E.2d 377,
385-86 (1946). The prosecutor's cross examination and arguments are set forth ex-
tensively in the dissent of Justice Richman. Id. at 406, 67 N.E.2d at 382.
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was not establishing the guilt of the defendant but was only commenting
on the extent of the recommended penalty. The court further said that
it was "not certain that the criticized cross-examination was improper."
Since the trial judge ruled on the motion for a new trial that the defend-
ant received a fair trial, the supreme court held it would not question his
decision and discretion. It did admit, however, that the trial judge should
have intervened to restrain the prosecutor even though the defense failed
to object.
Justice Richman, in his dissenting opinion, admitted the guilt of the
appellant but condemned the failure of the trial court to discharge its duty
properly. It was his position that where the prosecutor is allowed to in-
ject perjudicial matters wilfully and persistently, the defendant is de-
prived of a fair trial. He pointed out that the majority failed to consider
that there are three officers in the court-the defense attorney, the prose-
cutor, and the judge-and that all three are responsible for maintaining
the standard of judicial calm so necessary to a fair trial. The silence of
the trial judge here indicated approval. Bringing the fourteenth amend-
ment of the federal constitution directly to bear on the issue, he said,:
Whether the argument be based upon a defendant's right or up-
on the trial court's duty, due process requires a fair and impar-
tial trial. Lack of procedure, or slavish adherence to procedure
that interferes with this fundamental substantive right and re-
quirement, in my opinion, violates the Fourteenth Amendment."
The dissent in the Blue case was the first major assault on the prior cases
and the first attempt to consider indiscretion or misconduct in a proper
perspective, i.e., as a constitutional problem.
The court advanced tremendously ten years later, as the dissenting
opinion became the holding of the court in the case of Wasy v. State."0 In
this case, a prosecution for abortion, the prosecutor charged in open
court that someone on behalf of the defense had tried to bribe a witness
for the state and that he intended to investigate. His charge was carried
by newspaper and radio throughout the county. A motion to withdraw
the submission and declare a mistrial was denied. When the prosecutor
subsequently failed to follow up his charge, the supreme court felt com-
pelled to assume that he made the charge. to prejudice the defendant.
Abandoning their former policy of reversing only when the result ap-
peared harsh or incorrect, the court said:
79. Id. at 422, 67 N.E.2d at 389.
80. 236 Ind. 215, 138 N.E.2d 1 (1956).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
[W] e need only concern ourselves with whether or not the ac-
cused received a fair and impartial trial. It is not a question,
was the defendant guilty? The question is, did she have a fair
trial? Under our system of criminal law, a guilty person, as
well as an innocent person, is entitled to a fair and impartial
trial. No court has the right to assume the guilt of any person
accused until that person has been given a fair and impartial
trial followed by a finding of guilt. The courts, and all its of fi-
cials, should be dedicated to these fundamental principles of
American justice."' (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court of Montana reflects the same attitude in a recent
decision: "Our concern is, did the defendant have a fair and impartial
trial according to the rules prescribed by the laws of this state.1
2
Trial court standards can best be maintained by reversing trial court
verdicts in cases where standards have been lowered. Orfield points out
that such reversals not only give the defendant another opportunity to
be tried fairly but also serve notice on all trial court judges in the juris-
diction that fairness is paramount.8 3
The affiliation of politics and prosecution has other unfortunate ef-
fects. One such effect is bargaining by the prosecutor to build a con-
viction record. 4 The public normally measures the success of a prosecu-
tor by his record of convictions. Yet this record is largely comprised of
"pleas of guilty, made on 'bargain days,' in the assured expectation of
nominal punishment, as the cheapest way out, and amounting in effect to
license to violate the law.""5
Another ill effect resulting from the influence of politics is an in-
ability to obtain the most qualified and capable men for the office.8" This
is especially true in areas where one political party is dominant and nomi-
nation is usually equivalent to election. The office of the prosecuting
attorney is peculiarly filled with temptations. In its worse form, it may
81. Id. at 220, 138 N.E.2d at 3.
82. State v. Toner, 127 Mont. 283, 263 P.2d 971 (1953). In this case, the court
reversed even though the evidence was strong, but its decision to reverse was also
encouraged in part by the severity of the sentence. The opinion, however, still seems
to foretell of the trend to reverse regardless of the strength of the state's evidence. See
also State v. Cleveland, 6 N.J. 316, 78 A.2d 560 (1951) ; People v. Lombard, 4 App. Div.
2d 666, 168 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1957); Potter v. State, 91 Okla. Crim. 186, 217 P.2d 844
(1950).
83. ORFIELD, op. cit. .spra note 67, at 186.
84. For an excellent treatment of prosecutor's discretion, see Note, 103 U. PA. L.
REv. 1057 (1955). See also MOLEY, op. cit. supra note 21, at 166-92.
85. POUND, op. cit. supra note 14, at 184.
86. Id. at 193-96.
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shield criminal syndicates from law enforcement; in its best form, it is an
effective means of law enforcement." Rather than remove discretionary
power from the prosecutor, we should vest this power in men who are
able to exercise it fairly and fully.88
Finally, our present system of political prosecutors results in a vast
number of separate offices within the state, none of which is responsible
to a central office. Just as there are economies and advantages in con-
solidating rural schools, there is a like advantage to be gained by con-
solidating prosecutors' offices in such areas. Rather than have several
part time prosecutors with little or no experience, equipment, or qualifi-
cations, a consolidated prosecutor's office would have a full time quali-
fied attorney to concentrate his entire attention to his duties. 9
As states become more aware of the undesirability of political in-
fluence on the prosecutor's office, they should study the remedial alterna-
tives closely. One alternative recently suggested is to allow private per-
sons to prosecute when it appears that public prosecutors are not properly
performing their duties.9" This remedy would help "balance the ex-
cesses of the district attorney's discretion with individual and community
vigilance." 1  This proposal, however, does not strike at the heart of the
problem. Prosecutors would still be under the domination of politics,
and the ancient problems of justice by vengeance would arise in this
country.
The best solution involves the elimination, in so far as possible, of
the political domination of the prosecutor's office.12  The reform is ad-
mittedly long term, if not idealistic and Utopian. A step in the right
direction would be to place the prosecutor's office on an appointive basis,
as is the office of United States District Attorney. It must at least be
conceded that the governor and senate could be trusted to make more care-
fully considered and unbiased appointments than can county and urban
politicians. As an appointed official, the prosecutor would not be com-
pletely disengaged from politics, but the way would be open to select
prosecutors on the basis of legal, rather than political, ability and capa-
87. MOLEY, op. cit. supra note 21, at 13, 74-94.
88. Id. at 190-92.
89. Baker and DeLong, The Prosecuting Attorney and Reform in Criminal Justice,
26 J. Crn. L., C. & P.S. 821, 830-46 (1936); POUND, op. cit. supra note 14, at 184-88.
90. Note, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwarranted
Inaction, 65 YALE L. REv. 209 (1955).
91. Id. at 234.
92. This is the solution offered by most eminent writers, including Pound, Baker,
DeLong, and Goodnow. PoUND, op. cit. supra note 14, at 188; Baker and DeLong,
The Prosceuting Attorney and His Office, 25 J. Cuim. L., C. & P.S. 884, 885 (1935);
GooDNow op. cit. supra note 23, at 416-17.
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city." In this way more capable and qualified men could be selected-
men who are able to grasp fully the importance and responsibility of
the office.
MENTAL INCOMPETENCE IN INDIANA: STANDARDS AND
TYPES OF EVIDENCE
The Indiana statutes make it clear that mentally ill and incapacitated
persons are to be treated differently from other persons in regard to cer-
tain attempted legal acts, and the legal consequences which flow from a
finding of mental incompetence are fairly uniform.1 There is, however,
some confusion as to the standards which must be met in each of the
transactions in order to prove an allegation of mental incompetence, and
there is even more confusion as to the types of evidence which must be
produced if the applicable standard is to be satisfied. The purpose of
this inquiry is to examine these latter questions in four major areas of
private law-contracts, wills, gifts, and guardianship. The statutes rele-
vant to these areas, except the ones relating to guardianship, operate di-
rectly or indirectly upon the purported legal act of a person "of unsound
mind."2  The guardianship provisions are operative upon an "incompe-
tent."'  Both of these terms have statutory definitions.4  The words of
93. "Popular election, wrapped as it is in the American flag, is a very difficult
institution to root out even though virtually every student of the problem concludes
that the basic reform necessary is the elimination of politics from the office. But the
query naturally arises: how would appointment eliminate 'politics'? The answer is
best demonstrated by experience. United States attorneys on the whole enjoy a greater
prestige, and their records are demonstrably more efficient than those of the elected
state prosecutors." Hobbs, Prosecutor's Bias, An Occupational Disease, 2 ALA. L. REv.
40, 57-58 (1949). Pound wisely adds: "If it is imperative to divorce prosecution from
politics, it is no less imperative to divorce the bench from politics." PoUND, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 192.
1. Mental incompetence is defined as "that type or degree of mental disorder, in
any particular case, which is legally significant and which produces a different legal
result than would have followed from the same situation had not the particular type or
degree of mental disorder been -present." Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of
Mental Incompetency, 39 Micar. L. REv. 1189, 1191-92 (1940).
2. IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-102 (Burns 1951) (alienation of lands) ; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 8-141 (Burns 1946) (contracts, sales and conveyances generally) ; IND. ANN. STAT. §
58-102 (Burns 1951) (purchase of necessaries) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-501 (Burns 1953)
(testamentary disposition).
3. IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-106 (Burns 1953).
4. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-4701 (Bums 1946) (general provisions relating to civil
procedure). "[Third] The phrase 'of unsound mind' includes idiots, noncompotes [non
compos mentis], lunatics and distracted persons."
IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-101 (Burns 1953). "Definitions and use of terms: . . . (c) An
'incompetent' is any person who is (1) Under the age of majority, (2) Incapable by
